WORKING PAPERS
'Optimal Taxation of Risky Entrepreneurial Capital', with Corina Boar. (abstract) (slides) (pdf)
'The Revelation Incentive for Issue Engagement in Campaigns', with Chitralekha Basu. (abstract) (pdf)
'Capital Deaccumulation and the Large Persistent Effects of Financial Crises.' (abstract) (slides) (pdf)
'The Nash Wage Elasticity and Its Business Cycle Implications', with Mario Lupoli. (abstract) (available on request)
We propose a new measure of aggregate wage rigidity, the Nash wage elasticity (NWE). The NWE represents the percentage change in the actual wage rate when the wage that would occur under Nash bargaining changes by 1%. Using a range of different measures of the cost of labor, we estimate values for the NWE in US data that range from 0 to 0.3. These estimates indicate (a) a high degree of aggregate wage rigidity and (b) that the Nash bargaining provides a poor description of US wage setting. We show that NWE plays an important role in business cycles. A simple SAM model suggests that, if workers are paid Nash-bargained wages rather than actual wages, then the cyclical volatility of unemployment would decrease to 26% of what it is in the data.
WORKS IN PROGRESS
'Quantifying the Macroeconomic Impact of Credit Expansions', with Corina Boar, Kjetil Storesletten and Yicheng Wang. (abstract)
'Optimal Taxation of Risky Entrepreneurial Capital', with Corina Boar. (abstract) (slides) (pdf)
'The Revelation Incentive for Issue Engagement in Campaigns', with Chitralekha Basu. (abstract) (pdf)
'Capital Deaccumulation and the Large Persistent Effects of Financial Crises.' (abstract) (slides) (pdf)
'The Nash Wage Elasticity and Its Business Cycle Implications', with Mario Lupoli. (abstract) (available on request)
We propose a new measure of aggregate wage rigidity, the Nash wage elasticity (NWE). The NWE represents the percentage change in the actual wage rate when the wage that would occur under Nash bargaining changes by 1%. Using a range of different measures of the cost of labor, we estimate values for the NWE in US data that range from 0 to 0.3. These estimates indicate (a) a high degree of aggregate wage rigidity and (b) that the Nash bargaining provides a poor description of US wage setting. We show that NWE plays an important role in business cycles. A simple SAM model suggests that, if workers are paid Nash-bargained wages rather than actual wages, then the cyclical volatility of unemployment would decrease to 26% of what it is in the data.
WORKS IN PROGRESS
'Quantifying the Macroeconomic Impact of Credit Expansions', with Corina Boar, Kjetil Storesletten and Yicheng Wang. (abstract)
